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ABSTRACT. In organizational ecology, the analysis of
the impact of competition between populations on vital
ratios is relatively underdeveloped. This paper addresses
this issue by developing new competition measurements
that focus on the importance of organizational size. The
application of these measurements in the case of competi-
tion between organizational subforms in a population,
and their impact on mortality rates, demonstrate their
usefulness for modelling competition. Speciﬁcally, the
results show how levels of competition between ﬁrms in a
population can be more clearly analysed when the rival
population mass or concentration indices are used.
KEY WORDS: competition between subforms, probabil-
ity of failure, the cross eﬀects of concentration model, the
cross eﬀects of density model, the cross eﬀects of mass
model
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1. Introduction
In organizational ecology, investigations are car-
ried out on how organizational populations
change and develop through time by analysing
processes of organizational founding, growth,
decline, transformation, and mortality. This per-
spective, in terms of the levels of analysis used,
distinguishes between the organizational demog-
raphy, population ecology, and community ecol-
ogy of organizations (Hannan and Freeman,
1977, 1989). Organizational demography refers to
processes that apply at the level of populations of
organizations, population ecology refers to inter-
actions between localized sets of populations, and
community ecology refers to the processes that
follow from the full set of population interactions
in some systems (Carroll and Hannan, 2000).
Although most of the published research in this
ﬁeld is identiﬁed as ‘ecological’, this line of work
has a strong demographic element. That is,
research on organizational ecology has been fun-
damentally focused on the ﬁrst level of analysis.
The second level, and particularly the third level,
has been relatively unexplored (Astley, 1985;
Ranger-Moore et al., 1991; Hunt and Aldrich,
1998; Ingram and Simons, 2000). This limitation
is reﬂected in (1) the limited number of papers
developed in both population ecology and com-
munity ecology (the second and third levels of
analysis) (Carroll and Hannan, 2000), and (2) an
almost complete absence of other types of tests
because of the systematic application of density,
or number of organizations in a population, as
the basic variable to represent the size of the
populations.
In an eﬀort to extend previous research, this
paper: (1) delves deeper into the second level of
analysis, population ecology, and puts forward a
new test; (2) analyses the eﬀects of competition
between two organizational forms, classiﬁed in
terms of ownership structures, on the probability
of survivorship (Barnett and Carroll, 1987;
Ranger-Moore et al., 1991; Hannan and Carroll,
1992; Haveman, 1992; Rao and Neilsen, 1992;
Barron et al., 1994, 1998); (3) applies new mea-
surements of competition between populations,
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E-mail: jmoyano@ujaen.esother than that of population density. The objec-
tive is to show how alternative measurement pro-
tocols enhance our level of understanding of
ecology-level dynamics. Thus, we employ new
variables that, despite being used in the ﬁrst level
of analysis (population mass and level of concen-
tration), have never been developed within popu-
lation ecology.
We will test hypotheses using piecewise-expo-
nential models, and we will apply them in the
olive oil production industry in the province of
Jae ´ n (Spain) during the period 1944–1998. The
advantages of using this population are twofold:
not only does it belong to a new sector that
nobody has previously studied in terms of popu-
lation ecology, but also, the relevant oﬃcial
sources have provided us with information on
the industry’s internal characteristics that is
considered essential for developing this type of
research.
2. The theoretical background
2.1. Models of competition between populations
The selection can come from either competition
between organizations in a given population, or
from competition between organizations belong-
ing to diﬀerent populations (Carroll and Han-
nan, 1995).
The growth of a population can frequently
inﬂuence the survival chances of other popula-
tions. If two diﬀerent populations rely on the same
set of resources to survive, they will compete
between themselves to obtain them. The more
these necessary resources coincide for both popu-
lations, the greater the level of competition
between them. If we deﬁne a niche as the set of
resources necessary for a population to survive
(Hutchinson, 1957), two populations compete if,
and only if, their fundamental niches intersect
(Hannan and Carroll, 1992, p. 28). We could also
say that the greater the overlapping in the funda-
mental niches, the greater the competition between
the populations (Barron et al., 1998, p. 3).
In this way, the bigger the population, the
more resources it will consume, and, therefore,
the possibility of them being consumed by
another population will be reduced, with increas-
ing competition being the result (Rao and
Neilsen, 1992). It is natural, in this perspective,
to assume that the intensity of a competitive
eﬀect is proportional to the scale (or size) of the
competing population. If the ﬁrst population is
of a very small scale, the life chances of the sec-
ond are not much aﬀected. If the ﬁrst grows in
scale, then competition intensiﬁes. In other
words, ecological competition is scale dependent
(Barron et al., 1998, p. 13).
Traditionally, population size has been mea-
sured by the density or the number of organiza-
tions belonging to the population, which has led
to the development of the cross eﬀects of density
model (Hannan and Freeman, 1989), which
establishes that the intensity of competition is
proportional to the density of competing popula-
tions. This model arises as an extended version
of the Lotka-Volterra framework used in biology
to likewise register competition between popula-
tions. According to this model, two populations
compete when the size of each population lowers
the carrying capacity of the other, with carrying
capacity being deﬁned as the number of organi-
zations that can be sustained in a particular envi-
ronment in isolation from other populations
(Hannan and Carroll, 1992, p. 29). We can
express this model mathematically as follows:
dn1
dt
¼r1   n1  






¼r2   n2  




with ni being the density of population i. The
growth rate for each population (dni/dt)i sb r o -
ken down into three components: (1) ri, the
intrinsic properties of the form that aﬀect its
speed of growth in the absence of resource limi-
tations and competition; (2) Ki, the carrying
capacity of each population; (3) aij, the speciﬁc
competition between populations (Hannan, 1986,
p. 6). Comparing these two equations, we can
observe how the presence of the competitor
reduces the carrying capacity of the ﬁrst popula-
tion from K1 to K1-a12n2. The competition coeﬃ-
cients, a12 and a21, tell how the carrying capacity
of each population declines with the density of
the competitor (ni).
The studies that test this model show that in-
terdependencies among populations have a direct
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essarily in the expected direction. We can distin-
guish three types of interdependence (Hannan,
1986, pp. 3–4; Hannan and Freeman, 1989,
pp. 96–97): (1) competitive, (2) predator form,
and (3) mutualistic. The ﬁrst refers to the situa-
tion in which the presence of a population
reduces the growth rate of another (Baum and
Oliver, 1991; Brittain, 1994). In other cases, com-
petitive relationships can change to the predator
form when the expansion of a population legiti-
mates the other, but the growth of the second
worsens the life chances of the ﬁrst by eroding its
resource base (Swaminathan and Wiedenmayer,
1991; Brittain, 1994). If balanced, coexistence is
not possible; the second will invade the ﬁrst’s
niche, which will subsequently disappear in
accordance with the competitive exclusion princi-
ple (Gause, 1934). The relationships will be
mutualistic when the expansion of one stimulates
the expansion of another, and vice versa, which
will reduce their mortality rates (Barnett, 1990;
Ingram and Baum, 1997).
In several studies, only one of the cross eﬀects
of density is present. The papers developed by
Carroll and Wade (1991) and Carroll and
Swaminathan (1992) are examples of mutualistic
relationships in one direction. In studies by
Hannan and Freeman (1988), Barnett (1990),
Rao and Neilsen (1992), and Baum, Korn and
Kotha (1995) the relationship is competitive.
A ﬁnal possibility is that interdependence may
be nonmonotonic. That is, growth in the density
of a population could legitimate another one, until
the density growth becomes so great that competi-
tive interactions dominate. We can observe this in
Silverman et al. study (1997), whereas the papers
by Hannan and Freeman (1989), and Staber
(1992) report the opposite result.
All these studies consider that the key variable
for estimating the size of a rival population is the
number of organizations (or the cross eﬀects of
density). It is possible that there are variables
other than density that come closer to the concept
of population size (Carroll and Harrison, 1994).
In organizational and economic theory, it is
believed that larger organizations generate stron-
ger competition than do their smaller rivals
because of several factors, such as (1) the ability
to reduce their dependence on the environment
and other organizations (Thompson, 1967;
Pfeﬀer and Salanzik, 1978), (2) greater market
power and superior access to resources (Aldrich
and Auster, 1986; Haveman, 1993), (3) greater
endurance in situations of resource shortages
(Levinthal, 1991), (4) greater recognition
(Edwards, 1955), and (5) the securing of beneﬁts
derived from economies of scale and scope
(Scherer and Ross, 1990).
On the other hand, two factors condition a
population’s growth rate in a competitive situa-
tion with another: the smaller organizations of
the rival population proliferating in number, and
the organizations in the second population
becoming larger in size. We should understand
size as a structural feature of the organization,
and we measure it as productive capacity or as
scale of operations (Barron et al., 1994, pp. 394–
395). This implies that competition between both
populations could be better modelled by using
the sum of the sizes of all organizations in the
rival population.
Using this global size, we could build a model
that examines the competitive interactions pro-
duced between populations with similar resource
necessities (that is, between populations with
overlapping fundamental niches). That is, a
model that, like the cross eﬀects density model,
uses the Lotka–Volterra framework to discover
the eﬀect of the aggregate size of a population
on the probability of failure in a second popula-
tion with which it competes. Using similar termi-
nology, we could call this new model the cross
eﬀects of mass model.
To reformulate the Lotka–Volterra model, we
have based our work on Barnett and Amburgey’s
idea (1990). Nevertheless, it would be possible to
consider replacing the growth rate in numbers,
which we have introduced into the formulae,
with the growth rate in mass.
dn1
dt
¼r1   n1  






¼r2   n2  




where ni is the density of population i, dni/dt rep-
resents the growth rate in numbers of the popula-
tion i, Kmi is the mass of the population i that
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resources held constant, and Mi is the mass or
aggregate size of the population i at a given time.
The presence of a second population in the
same niche reduces the mass that can be sus-
tained by this niche regarding the ﬁrst population
from Ki1 to Km1)c12M2. The coeﬃcients c12 and
c21 show how the mass that can be sustained by
the niche for each population is reduced with the
aggregate size of the competing population.
This model is based on the original Barnett
and Amburgey (1990) model, called the mass
dependence model, which establishes that the
largest organizations are also stronger competi-
tors and, for that reason, global size increases in
the population increase death rates. However,
from an empirical point of view, the results
obtained in studies that incorporate mass in mor-
tality models are not conclusive. Thus, Baum and
Mezias (1992) and Hannan and Carroll (1992)
ﬁnd a competitive eﬀect produced by the popula-
tion mass. Nevertheless, Barnett and Amburgey
(1990), Barnett (1997), and Ingram and Baum
(1997) ﬁnd a mutualistic eﬀect of mass on the
risk of failure.
Continuing the line of reasoning of this model,
the cross eﬀects of the mass model suggest that a
population’s competitive strength is proportional
to its global size, and that this strength is used to
obtain the resources needed by its members, thus
reducing the life chances of the elements making
up the second population that shares the same
niche. In short, the increase in the global mass of
the largest population should signiﬁcantly
increase the mortality rates in populations with
smaller mass.
Ingram and Baum (1997) for the ﬁrst time
introduced the eﬀects that the average mass of a
population can have on mortality rates in
another population. These authors, however, did
not theoretically develop a model that uses cross
eﬀects of mass as a key prediction variable for
organizational failure. Barron et al. (1998) explic-
itly introduce competitive interactions in terms of
the rival population’s mass. The competitive
eﬀect of cross eﬀects of mass is introduced into
the models to estimate the growth rate of the
rival population. Nevertheless, in this research,
we use cross eﬀects of mass as a measure that
adapts to the concept of competition between
populations, aﬀecting the mortality rates of each
of them.
The variables used in the cross eﬀects of den-
sity models and the cross eﬀects of mass models,
even when they are variables that indicate a pop-
ulation’s competitive potential, are in themselves
incomplete, because, having been measured in
absolute values, they do not address the diﬀer-
ences existing between members of the same pop-
ulation. That is, the ﬁrst variable, density, takes
into account the number of organizations but
not the individual size of each. In contrast, mass
takes into account the total volume of the orga-
nization but not the number of organizations. If
we consider the information given by the mass
variable, we cannot discern if a population is
composed of an inﬁnite number of organizations
of a relative size close to zero, or if it is one sin-
gle organization that consumes all the resources.
To measure both eﬀects at the same time, it is
necessary to analyse the size distribution of orga-
nizations in a population through concentration
(Boone and van Witteloostuijn, 1995). Likewise,
to understand the direction of population mass
through time, it is necessary to associate it with
the many diﬀerent distributions of organizational
sizes that may exist (Barron, 1999, p. 427).
Therefore, if the fundamental niches of two
populations intersect, the life chances of the
members of one of them depend not only on the
level of concentration of its population, but also
on the level of concentration of the rival popula-
tion.
If we consider the internal composition of a
population, that is, the diﬀerences that exist
between the organizations it comprises, it may be
possible to understand the competitive dynamics
between populations. For this reason, it is vital
to incorporate the internal power relationships
that are produced between the members of a
population, which could be obtained from the
relationships between organizational sizes
through concentration. To that end, we have
built a new model of competitive interactions
that uses, as a fundamental exogenous variable,
the level of concentration of each population
and, to use the same terminology, we call it the
cross eﬀects of concentration model. This model
extends the Lotka-Volterra framework by
introducing competition between populations in
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them.
Given that competition intensity is propor-
tional to the similarity in size of organizations
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Hannan et al.,
1990), a reduced level of concentration would
imply strong rivalry between the organizations of
the population, because there would be many
organizations and the diﬀerence in size between
them would be reduced. To relieve competitive
tension in a population, part of it would be
transferred to a neighbouring population. There-
fore, it is possible to identify the level of
concentration of a population as an indicator of
its competitive potential. As the level of concen-
tration increases, the level of size diﬀerence in
organizations also increases, thereby reducing the
competitive tension within the population and, as
a result, their inclination to compete with other
populations.
We should not confuse the cross eﬀects of con-
centration model with the resource partitioning
model (Carroll, 1985). Carroll put forward the
hypothesis that, as market concentration
increases, mortality rates in specialist organiza-
tions decline and in generalist organizations they
rise. The exogenous variable is not the level of con-
centration that exists in each organizational form
(or cross eﬀects of concentration), but it is the level
in the market in general. Competition between
organizational forms is not, therefore, the driving
force of the resource partitioning model (Boone
et al., 2000).
2.2. Competition between organizational subforms
As we have already mentioned, competition
between populations arises when their
fundamental niches overlap. Although there are
diverse situations in which the niches of interact-
ing populations do cross, in this paper we have
concentrated on one particular case where the
population is divided into two organizational
subforms (Po ´ los et al., 2002).
Traditionally, organizational form is deﬁned
as a blueprint for organizational action, for
transforming inputs into outputs (Hannan and
Freeman, 1977, p. 935). The crucial assumption
underlying the notion of organizational forms is
that it is possible to identify relatively invariant
organizational characteristics that make for
stability over time, which commits the
organization to a recognizable set of environmen-
tal dependencies and to a limited range of
plausible behaviours (Freeman and Lomi, 1994,
p. 273). However, this static assumption is actu-
ally overcome. Form would be a type of identity
understood as a function of the social codes that
specify the properties that an entity can
legitimately possess (Po ´ los et al., 2002).
On the basis of this deﬁnition, population is
conceived as a set of entities (organizations) with
a common minimal external identity in a
bounded system in a period of time (Po ´ los et al.,
2002; Hannan et al., in press). However, in spite
of insiders and outsiders that could ﬁx the mini-
mal identities that identify the organizational
form, there are distinctions that would legitimate
their analysis and permit the deﬁnition of the
subform as a new unit of analysis (Po ´ los et al.,
2002, pp. 23–24).
Inside any population, one of the important
distinctive features that serve to deﬁne subforms
is ownership structure (Aldrich and Marsden,
1988, p. 58; Meyer and Zucker, 1989, p. 71).
The structure of property rights deﬁnes the
institutional basis of power relations among indi-
viduals in the production process within the
organization, and in the exchange between orga-
nizations (Bowels, 1984). This structure aﬀects
the election process of organizational form
(Robbins, 1987; Lazerson, 1988) and, therefore,
organizational diversity. Likewise, the ownership
structure aﬀects ﬁrm performance by emphasiz-
ing how basic organizational design elements,
such as incentives and monitoring, shape patterns
of organizational learning (Sorenson and
Sorensen, 2001).
Using the criterion of ownership structure, we
can distinguish two organizational subforms:
stock form and mutual form. This classiﬁcation
has been frequently used in ecological research
(Barnett and Carroll, 1987; Ranger-Moore et al.,
1991; Hannan and Carroll, 1992; Haveman,
1992; Rao and Neilsen, 1992; Barron et al., 1994,
1998).
These subforms diﬀer from each other on sev-
eral points. On the one hand, the underlying
incentive is the possibility that owners must
obtain proﬁts from a proﬁtable investment. In
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satisfaction of the common needs of its members
and the feeling of solidarity. The main diﬀerence
between a member of the mutual subform and
the participants in the stock subform is the
dichotomy arising from the double condition of
supplier/owner or customer/owner in the same
person, thereby conferring a considerable portion
of power to him/her within the organization. In
the stock subform, diﬀerent people normally
undertake each of the supplier, customer, and
owner roles. In the stock subform separation
between ownership and control normally exists.
Nevertheless, in the mutual subform, integration
between the participation in a project and its co-
direction supposes that a considerable eﬀort of
‘cooperative spirit’ has to be undertaken by the
members (Staber, 1992, p. 1193).
Another diﬀerence has to do with power struc-
ture and governance system. The stock subform
is based on the direct relationship between man-
agement power and owned capital, the capital
subscribers being those who, as owners, under-
take the management of the enterprise (Bowels,
1984). In the mutual subform, the organizations
are constituted as democratic organizations con-
trolled by their members and run on the principle
of one member, one vote, with the value of each
vote being the same, irrespective of the ﬁnancial
investment made by the member of the organiza-
tion (Barron et al., 1994). The members have full
control, irrespective of the amount of capital
invested, which only serves to accredit them as
owners (Ingram and Simons, 2000).
The structure of those organizations integrated
in the mutual subform is determined by the
cooperative principles stated by the International
Cooperative Alliance (1995), which, at the same
time, constitute not only the spirit but also the
characteristic features of the running of an orga-
nization of this type. These principles would con-
stitute the organization’s ideology, which plays a
fundamental role in determining the organiza-
tional form (Simons and Ingram, 1997).
Another diﬀerence has to do with proﬁt shar-
ing. In the stock subform, capital, as a priority
production factor, is paid irrespective of its con-
tribution to the fulﬁlment of organizational
goals; in the mutual subform, the idea is to
reward the fulﬁlment of goals such as the
creation of wealth and the creation of value
added, which highlight the ‘person’ as a produc-
tion factor as opposed to others (Jeantet, 2000).
Having proved the validity of the previous
classiﬁcation of organizational subforms, the next
step is to investigate whether these forms com-
pete. Beforehand, it was convenient to underline
some of the elements that allow us to speculate
about some of the possible links between the
organizational subforms indicated. However,
none of these speculations allows us to develop
formal hypotheses, which is consistent with other
papers that have examined competition between
populations but have not explicitly established
hypotheses (Carroll and Wade, 1991; Ranger-
Moore et al., 1991; Carroll and Swaminathan,
1992; Staber, 1992; Barron et al., 1998; Lomi,
1995, 2000).
Populations are divided into segments that
react heterogeneously to competitive and institu-
tional processes (Lomi, 1995). This conclusion is
consistent with the idea that it is diﬃcult to con-
ceive of populations in a perfectly linked graph
in which each organization aﬀects and is aﬀected
by another (Lomi, 1995; Baum and Haveman,
1997). In our case, the two organizational sub-
forms depend on similar sets of resources, with
the absence of institutional or technological
boundaries that could provoke further divisions.
The high degree of overlapping of their niches is
what gives rise to competition between both
organizational subforms (Baum and Singh, 1994;
Ingram and Baum, 1997; Barron et al., 1998;
Hannan et al., in press).
In principle, one would suppose the mutual
subform to be less competition oriented than the
stock subform, because of the values and princi-
ples that determine the way it is run. Neverthe-
less, the idea of a common cooperative culture
and tradition, as the basis for cooperative and
mutualist relations, stands in contrast to the
observation that cooperatives sometimes behave
as ‘mini-capitalists’ (Bradley and Gelb, 1983),
competing with other organizations not only for
material resources but also for political support
and social legitimacy (Staber, 1992). Some case
studies suggest that, especially in competitive
environments, mutuals, rather than stock sub-
form ﬁrms, are often pressured into adopting
procedures that are more eﬃcient and, in this
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1992, p. 1194). These arguments lead us to
believe that both subforms should compete to
obtain the resources they need to survive.
To conﬁrm this supposition, we will apply the
models of competitive interactions mentioned in
the previous section to the organizational sub-
forms found in a speciﬁc industry, which will so
allow us to test the validity of the new models.
2.3. Organizational subforms in the olive oil
production industry
To test this theoretical background we will use
the olive oil production industry in the province
of Jae ´ n. We chose this industry because the prov-
ince is a leader in the production of olive oil,
with an average annual production of 312,000 t,
which constitutes 13.8% of world and 17.7% of
European olive oil production (Consejo Oleicola
Internacional, 2001).
By taking the oil mill form (‘almazara’) and
examining the ownership structure of the ﬁrm, it
is possible to distinguish the two organizational
subforms described in the theoretical
background. On one side, there are mutual oil
mills that mill their members’ olives; they gener-
ally belong to cooperatives. On the other, there
are stock oil mills that comprise organizations
belonging to private enterprises that either mill
the olives acquired from farmers through diverse
contracts or mill the olives from their own
groves.
Therefore, both subforms operate in the same
business, in the same customer market, but they
diﬀer in (1) the nature and motivation of those
who constitute the organization, (2) the gover-
nance system, (3) proﬁt sharing, (4) the support
received from public administration, and (5) their
taxation status (Barron et al., 1998, p. 16).
The competition between these subforms is
established, theoretically, in two arenas: ﬁrst,
through the acquisition of raw materials (olives);
and second, through the release of the ﬁnal prod-
uct (olive oil). However, in reality, competition is
almost exclusively reduced to the ﬁrst of these
environments, given that the commercial incapac-
ity of the oil mills, both mutuals and stock,
means that the production of virgin olive oil
obtained is sold at the price set by the companies
at the next stage in the agro-alimentary chain,
that is, by multinationals that operate in a
pseudo-oligopoly (Parras-Rosa, 1997; Torres-
Ruı´z, 1998; Torres-Ruı´z et al., 2000).
The rapid decomposition of the fruit after it is
harvested means that the fruit must be trans-
formed into oil immediately after harvest to
avoid a reduction in quality and a consequential
loss in market value (Uceda-Ojeda and Hermoso-
Ferna ´ ndez, 1997). This obliges the oil mills to
locate their plants close to their suppliers, which
explains the high number (or density) of organi-
zations in this industry. In Figure 1, we show the
evolution of the density of both organizational
subforms mentioned over the period from 1944
to 1998.
To understand this ﬁgure, we must indicate
that the mutual subform appears after the stock
subform (Hoogveld and Jurjus, 1990, p. 37). The
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Figure 1. Number of mutual and stock olive oil mills during the period 1944–1998.
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characteristic period of history (1950–1970) in
which the Spanish economy and agriculture lived
in complete autarky (Lo ´ pez-Ontiveros, 1982,
p. 48). Moreover, public administration reso-
lutely supported this organizational subform
(Lo ´ pez-Ontiveros, 1982). For this reason, up
until 1977 the number of stock oil mills was far
higher than the number of mutual oil mills (Fig-
ure 1), with 1954 being the year with the greatest
diﬀerence in density (a diﬀerence of 971 oil
mills). After 1977, an important qualitative
change took place in the structure of this indus-
try, which resulted in the mutual subform becom-
ing the more important.
On the other hand, the loss of quality that the
fruit undergoes from the moment it is delivered
obliges the oil mill to install adequate milling
capacity. The diﬃculty entailed in predicting the
exact amount of fruit available in any particular
harvest, and the need to guarantee its rapid
transformation forces the oil mills to install pro-
ductive capacities according to the maximum
fruit delivery. To this, we must add the techno-
logical advances in extraction systems, which
have increased milling capacities. Figure 2 shows
the evolution of the aggregate size of each orga-
nizational subform (or population mass).
We can deduce that, although the mutual sub-
form mass has not stopped growing through the
study period, the stock subform mass has
remained practically constant. We can prove
that, as in the evolution of density, after the
1970s the mutual subform overtakes the stock
subform in what is referred to as transformation
of raw material potential. After the 1990s, both
subforms increase in size as a result of the tech-
nological advances in the extraction systems.
To ﬁnalize the characterization of the organi-
zational subforms that make up this industry,
and considering the evolution in the number of
participants and in the aggregate size of each of
them, it is also necessary to observe the evolution
of their levels of concentration. These levels
appear in Figure 3, where the evolution, which is
totally opposite in the concentration of both
organizational subforms, is represented. Whereas
in the mutual subform, concentration has
declined to the point where it has remained con-
stant, the stock subform remained constant until
the 1970s, when it began to increase. That is, the
increase in concentration in the stock subform is
due to there being fewer, but larger, organiza-
tions, whereas the concentration of the mutual
subform declined because, on the whole, it grew
more in aggregate size than in the number of
organizations. Nevertheless, we note that there
was excessive fragmentation in both organiza-
tional subforms, although mainly in the stock
subform, as is shown by the low Herﬁndhal
index values during the period analysed.
3. Method
3.1. Data sources and sample
To develop this research we have built two data-
bases that contain information on each of the
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Figure 2. Aggregate size of the mutual and stock form during the period 1944–1998.
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the period 1944–1998. The data was obtained
from the Register of Agricultural Firms of the
Agriculture and Fisheries Department, and from
the Register of Cooperatives of the Trade and
Industry Department of the Andalusian Regional
Government.
The database that includes the stock subform
comprises 716 oil mills that operated at some
time during the study period. Of these oil mills,
392 disappeared during the study period, whereas
data concerning the rest are censored (Lawless,
1982; Cox and Oakes, 1984). The second data-
base comprised 303 mutual oil mills, of which 70
disappeared between 1944 and 1998.
The disappearance of an oil mill is considered
to have occurred when it stopped operations, but
not when its ownership or trade name changed,
since, in these cases, there are no justiﬁable rea-
sons to conclude that the whole organization has
been transformed; in fact, it could continue using
the same procedures and routines (Baum and
Mezias, 1992; Ingram and Inman, 1996).
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Density
We measure this variable as the number of active
oil mills at the beginning of each year. We have
introduced this variable into the model in a lin-
ear speciﬁcation and in a quadratic speciﬁcation
with the result divided by 10. The reason for hav-
ing included this variable with its quadratic speci-
ﬁcation is to attempt to register non-linear eﬀects
between the exogenous variables and the proba-
bility of survivorship (Hannan and Carroll,
1992). We have calculated this variable for both
the mutual and the stock subform.
3.2.2. Population mass
This variable takes into account the aggregate of
the sizes of all the oil mills that were active at
the beginning of each year. As with density, we
have incorporated this variable into the models
in a linear speciﬁcation and in a quadratic speci-
ﬁcation with the result divided by 100 (Barnett
and Amburgey, 1990). We have also calculated it
for both the mutual and stock subforms.
3.2.3. Concentration
This variable takes into account size equality of
the oil mills that make up the respective organi-
zational forms. We measure it by using the Her-
ﬁndhal index. We chose this index because (1) it
veriﬁes the properties required from the concen-
tration indices (Hannah and Kay, 1977;
Encauoua and Jacquemin, 1980), (2) it has
already been used as a measure of concentration
in ecological literature (Barnett and Carroll,
1987; Wholey et al., 1992), and (3) it is a suitable
indicator of concentration, because it gives more
importance to the disparity of sizes between
organizations than to the number of organiza-
tions. We have introduced this variable into the
models in a linear speciﬁcation and in a qua-
dratic speciﬁcation with the result multiplied by
10,000, and independently calculated for each
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Figure 3. Concentration levels in the mutual and stock form during the period 1944–1998.
69 New size measurements in Population Ecology3.3. Control variables
The possible existence of eﬀects provoked by
variables other than exogenous variables has
forced us to introduce two types of control vari-
ables. First, we developed the characteristics,
peculiar to the organizations, that are not being
studied in this paper but that may aﬀect their
failure. Next, we developed the variables that
aﬀect the probability of death and thus are the
variables that characterize the environmental
situation.
3.3.1. Age periods
We use six age-period dummy variables to con-
trol for age dependence in mortality (Ingram and
Simons, 2000).
3.3.2. Exploitation system
Given that Boone, Bro ¨ cheler and Carroll (2000)
discovered that whether production ownership
fell on one or on various owners aﬀects the prob-
ability of organizational failure, we created a
dummy variable that tells us, at any moment, if
the owner exploits the oil mill (value 1) or if it is
exploited under lease (value 0).
3.3.3. Organizational size
We have identiﬁed the natural logarithm of mill-
ing capacity installed as a variable that represents
the organizational size of each oil mill by follow-
ing the stream of investigation within organiza-
tional ecology that regards organizational size as
capacity (see Barron et al., 1994, p. 395). We
could also consider that the installed production
capacity is the best measure of size, given that it
takes into account the space of the niche occu-
pied by each organization (Winter, 1990). We log
this variable to account for decreasing returns to
scale (Sorenson and Sorensen, 2001, p. 719).
3.3.4. Types of technology
Technology inﬂuences on the performance of
organizations, and signs of such inﬂuence are
reﬂected in mortality rates (Barnett, 1990; Sua ´ rez
and Utterback, 1995; Carroll and Teo, 1996). To
control possible variations in the probability of
failure according to the type of technology used,
we introduced two dummy variables: obsolete
technology and advanced technology. These
variables take a value of 1 if the oil mill used either
of the two types of technology, and 0 in the oppo-
site case. We introduced both variables because
both may exist simultaneously in the same organi-
zation, even though in diﬀerent production lines.
We introduced the following environment con-
trol variables:
3.3.5. Electric energy cost
Electric energy is the power source that supplies
the production system of an oil mill. This vari-
able takes into account the cost of this supply in
pesetas/kW per hour, which we obtained from
Bernal (1994) and the Ministerial Orders and
Royal Decrees that annually set the price of elec-
tricity. This variable has been introduced by fol-
lowing the approaches observed in other studies
that, by estimating vital rates, control the inci-
dence of the main organization cost (Barnett and
Carroll, 1987; Mascarenhas, 1996).
3.3.6. Institutional endorsement
Institutional theory proposes that increased em-
beddedness of a population in its institutional
environment facilitates its growth and survival
as time passes (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer
and Scott, 1983). Ecologists agree that this con-
nection increases a population’s chances of sur-
vival and growth by improving the capacity of
the population members to mobilize resources
and increase their legitimation (Hannan and
Carroll, 1992, p. 41). Several studies conﬁrm
that links with the institutional environment
increase organizational survival chances (Singh
et al., 1986; Miner et al., 1990; Baum and
Oliver, 1991). Given that institutional endorse-
ment could eliminate or reduce the limitations
inherent in the environment, we have introduced
a control variable that takes into account the
years of governmental action implying endorse-
ment of the constitution of organizations within
the mutual subform. In the literature, such sup-
port has been represented by dummy variables
associated with the approval received over a
given period (Carroll and Hannan, 2000,
pp. 203–204). For this reason, we have used a
dummy variable that takes into account the per-
iod eﬀect derived from institutional endorsement
of the mutual subform, and it covers the period
1950–1970.
70 Manuel Nu´n˜ez-Nickel and Jose´ Moyano-Fuentes3.4. Analysis
To carry out the necessary tests, we have used
the piecewise-exponential model with the follow-
ing hazard rate:
rðtÞ¼ebxðtÞ;
where b is the associated vector of coeﬃcients
and X the matrix of exogenous and control vari-
ables. The values of the diﬀerent variables were
introduced in one-year spells. This model allows
us to solve the left-truncated data problem by
including the age periods as control variable, and
using calendar time as a dependent variable that
allows us to estimate the instantaneous probabil-
ity of failure r(t).
Following the methodology explained above,
we used the statistical package Stata 6.0 (Stata
Corporation, 1999) to estimate the b parameters.
If b has a positive sign, the organization’s proba-
bility of failure will increase, whereas, this proba-
bility will be reduced if the sign is negative.
4. Results
In Table I, we show the basic statistics and the
correlations between exogenous and control vari-
ables for each organizational subform. Tables II
and III show the diﬀerent models of competition
between populations stated in the theoretical
background, for each of the organizational sub-
forms analysed.
In Table II, we present four piecewise-expo-
nential models of mortality in the stock subform.
Model 1 takes into account the cross eﬀects of
density model, revealing the impact that the
number of mutual and stock oil mills has on
mortality rates in the stock subform. We can
observe that the only signiﬁcant exogenous vari-
ables are the quadratic speciﬁcation of the cross
eﬀects of density and the linear eﬀect of the stock
subform, throwing into relief the evidence that
the cross eﬀects of density model ﬁts this phe-
nomenon, although with a fuzzier eﬀect (less sig-
niﬁcance) when we analyse the inﬂuences of the
stock subform density.
To give a graphic idea of the magnitude of the
nonlinear eﬀect of density of the stock and
mutual subforms on mortality rates in the stock
subform, we have calculated and graphically rep-
resented (Figures 4 and 5) the multipliers of the
aforementioned densities. We can see how the
risk of failure of the stock oil mills decreases
slowly as the stock subform density increases. On
the other hand, we can also see that the risk of
failure of the stock oil mills increases at ﬁrst
slowly, but later rises sharply as mutual subform
density increases.
In Model 2, we can see how only the mutual
subform mass has a highly signiﬁcant relation to
mortality rates of stock oil mills with both the
linear and quadratic coeﬃcients (the former posi-
tively related and the latter negatively). That is,
when the aggregate of the sizes of the mutual
subform increases, competition between both
forms intensiﬁes, so augmenting the risk of fail-
ure in the stock subform up to a certain level,
after which the probability of failure decreases
(Figure 6).
Comparing both models, we can see the simi-
larity between their global v
2 tests for the same
degrees of freedom. There is only a diﬀerence of
0.69 in favour of the density cross eﬀect. How-
ever, we can also see that the mass variable has
higher signiﬁcance levels for both coeﬃcients.
In Model 3, we can observe the highly signiﬁ-
cant impact that mutual subform concentration
has on stock subform mortality rates. Both the lin-
ear and the quadratic components of the cross
eﬀects of concentration are also signiﬁcant. To
identify the pattern that stock subform mortality
rates follow in terms of the level of concentration
of the mutual subform, we have calculated its mul-
tiplier. In Figure 7, we graphically reproduce the
behaviour of this multiplier, observing that it fol-
lows a nonmonotonic U-shaped pattern, which
means that the probability of failure in stock oil
mills is reduced with mutual subform concentra-
tion until it reaches a certain level, after which the
probability of failure of the stocks increases expo-
nentially. However, contrary to former models, in
this model there is also a clear and highly signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence from the stock subform concentra-
tion on the probability of failure in the stock
subform. In Figure 8, we graphically reproduce
the behaviour of this multiplier, observing that it
follows an inverse U-shaped pattern, which means
that probability of failure in stock oil mills is
increased with stock subform concentration until





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































72 Manuel Nu´n˜ez-Nickel and Jose´ Moyano-Fuentesit reaches a certain level, after which the probabil-
ity of failure of the stocks decreases.
Comparing this model with the previous one,
we can conclude that the cross eﬀects of concen-
tration model presents a similar complex pattern
of competition between both subforms (non-
monotonic pattern), although, in the opposite
sense. Despite this, the cross eﬀects of concentra-
tion model is the least accurate predictor of the
inﬂuence of competition between populations on
the probability of failure, since, its v
2 test is smal-
ler (87.07).
Table II also shows Model 4, where all inde-
pendent variables are included together (density,
mass, and concentration). In this model, we can
see how most of the variables change their signif-
icance level. For instance, Stock subform density,
Mutual subform mass, Stock subform concentra-
tion and (Stock subform concentration)
2 lose all
their degrees of signiﬁcance. In contrast, Mutual
subform density and (Stock subform mass)
2
obtain signiﬁcance in this model despite being
non-signiﬁcant in former models. Perhaps the
high correlation between all these independent
variables (multicolinearity) is the reason for these
changes (Table I).
In Table II, the signiﬁcant repercussions that
the organizational control variables have on
stock mill failure probability can be detected.
More speciﬁcally, in all three models we can see
how the log(size) of a stock oil mill has a highly
signiﬁcant negative impact on its probability of
TABLE II
Piecewise–exponential models of mortality in stock subform, 1944–1998
a
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Age periods
0–10 years 0.057 (0.078) 0.062 (0.079) 0.055 (0.081) 0.094 (0.079)
10–20 years 0.014 (0.038) 0.015 (0.037) 0.045 (0.036) 0.001 (0.038)
20–30 years )0.020 (0.299) )0.021 (0.029) )0.035 (0.029) )0.017 (0.030)
30–40 years 0.035 (0.027) 0.034 (0.027) 0.036 (0.028) 0.037 (0.027)
40–50 years )0.011 (0.022) )0.011 (0.022) )0.006 (0.022) )0.016 (0.022)
50+ years 0.003 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 0.004 (.005)
Stock subform density )0.005* (0.002) )0.010 (0.008)
(Stock subform density)
2/10 0.00001 (0.00002) )0.00006 (0.00006)
Mutual subform density )0.019 (0.010) )0.228**** (0.053)
(Mutual subform density)
2/10 0.001**** (0.0003) 0.005**** (0.001)
Stock subform mass 0.0007 (0.0007) )0.005 (0.003)
(Stock subform mass)
2/100 )0.00001 (0.00001) 0.0001* (0.00004)
Mutual subform mass 0.001**** (0.0001) 0.001 (0.001)
(Mutual subform mass)
2/100 )5.2E)06**** (9.8E)07) )0.00001* (5.4E)06)




)9335**** (1373.5) )1545.9 (2570.3)




239.32**** (39.14) 404.05**** (114.83)
Organizational size )1.08**** (0.085) )1.10**** (0.085) )1.06**** (0.086) )1.10**** (0.085)
Exploitation system )0.046 (0.111) )0.043 (0.111) )0.046 (0.111) )0.054**** (0.085)
Obsolete technology 0.472 (0.457) 0.437 (0.456) 0.458 (0.456) 0.490 (0.457)
Advanced technology )1.56 (0.849) )1.67* (0.848) )1.55 (0.849) )1.58 (0.850)
Energy cost )0.059* (0.027) )0.301**** (0.038) 0.388**** (0.085) 0.113 (0.123)
Institutional endorsement
of mutual subform
0.784*** (0.239) 0.886**** (0.221) 0.736** (2.68) 1.19**** (0.292)
Constant )2.23* (1.13) )6.9**** (1.63) )4.48**** (1.09) 33.67**** (9.05)
Chi-squared (v
2) 803.90**** 803.21**** 716.14**** 858.8****
Df 16 16 16 24
a Standard errors are in parentheses.
****p<0.0001; ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05.
73 New size measurements in Population Ecologydeath. These results are consistent with those
obtained in previous research that demonstrates
that size is a variable that decreases the probabil-
ity of organizational death (Carroll and Hannan,
2000). Another organizational variable that gen-
erates a signiﬁcant negative impact is the type of
technology used in the transformation phase. Oil
mills that use the most advanced technology in
TABLE III
Piecewise–exponential models of mortality in mutual subform, 1944–1998
a
Variables Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Age periods 0–10 years 0.153 (0.289) 0.156 (0.290) 0.161 (0.289) 0.150 (0.286)
10–20 years 0.152 (0.105) 0.154 (0.104) 0.159 (0.103) 0.159 (0.104)
20–30 years )0.136 (0.083) )0.139 (0.082) )0.139 (0.083) )0.137 (0.083)
30–40 years 0.085 (0.084) 0.091 (0.084) 0.098 (0.085) 0.084 (0.085)
40–50 years 0.060 (0.059) 0.054 (0.059) 0.047 (0.060) 0.056 (0.060)
50+ years )0.004 (0.012) )0.003 (0.012) )0.002 (0.012) )0.003 (0.012)
Mutual subform density )0.037 (0.027) )0.127 (0.151)
(Mutual subform density)
2/10 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.003)
Stock subform density )0.002 (0.005) 0.007 (0.019)
(Stock subform density)
2/10 0.00001 (0.0005) 0.00003 (0.0001)
Mutual subform mass 0.0004 (0.0003) )0.0003 (0.002)
(Mutual subform mass)
2/100 )1.10E)06 (2.2E)06) 5.36E)06 (9.81E)06)
Stock subform mass 0.001 (0.001) 0.004 (0.006)
(Stock subform mass)
2/100 )0.00003 (0.00002) )0.00008 (0.00009)
Mutual subform concentration )63.26 (87.14) )104.86 (546.82)
(Mutual subform concentration)
2 · 10,000 52.72 (111.65) )53.13 (480.62)
Stock subform concentration 585.68* (292.1) 1674.4 (1328.5)
(Stock subform concentration)
2 · 10,000 )5043.6* (2138.1) )8874.8 (5883.6)
Organizational size )1.28**** (0.211) )1.28**** (0.211) )1.25**** (0.211) )1.31**** (0.214)
Exploitation system )1.13**** (0.309) )1.13**** (0.308) )1.13**** (0.306) )1.10**** (0.308)
Obsolete technology 0.174 (0.757) 0.168 (0.758) 0.206 (0.756) 0.167 (0.759)
Advanced technology )0.890 (0.843) )0.892 (0.844) )0.888 (0.842) )0.935 (0.843)
Energy cost 0.139** (0.049) )0.003 (0.075) 0.387** (0.122) 0.185 (0.271)
Institutional endorsement
of mutual subform
0.328 (0.754) 1.03 (0.682) 0.304 (0.723) 0.291 (0.789)
Constant )2.78 (3.49) )8.01 (4.18) )5.55 (3.09) )10.30 (25.29)
Chi-squared (v
2) 126.03**** 124.25**** 123.09**** 137.6****
Df 16 16 16 24
a Standard errors are in parentheses.
****p<0.0001; ***p<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05.





















Figure 4. Eﬀects of density impact on organizational failure probability of stock subform.
74 Manuel Nu´n˜ez-Nickel and Jose´ Moyano-Fuentestheir production system run lower risks of fail-
ure. This is because the use of such technology
reduces extraction costs, and produces more ﬁnal
product (Hermoso-Ferna ´ ndez et al., 1994).
With reference to the impact of the environ-
mental control variables, we can see ﬁrstly that
institutional endorsement received by the mutual
subform has a positive inﬂuence on the probabil-





















Figure 5. Cross eﬀects of density impact on organizational failure probability of stock subform.





















Figure 6. Cross eﬀects of mass impact on organizational failure probability of stock subform.





















Figure 7. Cross eﬀects of concentration impact on organizational failure probability of stock subform.
75 New size measurements in Population Ecologyity of failure of stock oil mills. Institutional
endorsement of the mutual subform encouraged
the constitution of this type of oil mill, and so
had a negative impact on the continuity of the
existing stock oil mills. Second, there is a contra-
dictory relationship between the energy cost and
the probability of failure, which is shown by the
opposite signs of this variable in the ﬁrst two
models and in the third model.
In Table III, we present models of mutual
subform mortality. Models 5 and 6 take into
account models of competitive interactions
using the absolute size (density or mass) of the
stock subform. In both cases, we can see how
the size of the stock subform does not have a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on mutual oil mill mortality
rates. The lack of signiﬁcance in the cross
eﬀects of density and mass models could be
caused by a certain degree of multicolinearity
between the exogenous variables in linear terms
and in their quadratic speciﬁcation. Neverthe-
less, in order to maintain the same criteria as
in the previous analysis, and given that the
goodness of ﬁt of the models did not substan-
tially improve after the elimination of the qua-
dratic speciﬁcation, we opted to keep the most
complete models.
In the Model 7 in Table III, we observe that
the only variable that has a clear signiﬁcance is
the cross eﬀects of concentration, both the linear
and quadratic transformations. In order to detect
more speciﬁcally how the risk of failure evolves
as stock subform concentration increases, we
must use the calculation of its multiplier and its
graphical representation (Figure 9). In this graph,
we can see an inverse U-shaped pattern.
In relation to the control variables used, we
see, on the one hand, how the size of the oil mill
is inversely related to the risk of failure, and, on
the other hand, how the exploitation by the
owner reduces the probability of death, which is
derived from the speciﬁc nature of the mutual
subform.
Finally, as with the stock subform, we have
included all independent variables in an single
model (Model 8). Again, we can see how all vari-
ables, without exception, lose their degree of
signiﬁcance.
5. Discussion and conclusion
This paper represents an eﬀort to put forward
new measures of the competition concept. Fun-
damentally, organizational ecology has concen-
trated on understanding competition as the ﬁght
between members of a population to obtain the
resources they need, and analysing how such
competition aﬀects foundation, mortality, and
organizational growth rates. The concept of com-
petition is extended in this research by examining
not only competition within a subform, as in the
terminology of Po ´ los et al. (2002), but also com-
petition from another subform that has similar
resource needs. Our results show how, on some
occasions, the competition for resources does not
proceed from the members that constitute the
subform, but from organizations integrated in a
diﬀerent subform.





















Figure 8. Eﬀects of concentration impact on organizational failure probability of stock subform.
76 Manuel Nu´n˜ez-Nickel and Jose´ Moyano-FuentesFrom a methodological point of view, organi-
zational ecology assumes that competition
between populations is principally a function of
density or of the number of organizations in
competing populations. In this paper, we have
modelled competition between organizational
subforms by using density as well as other repre-
sentative variables of a subform’s competitive
potential. Thus, we have considered, indepen-
dently, that the threat of competition in a popu-
lation depends on both the aggregate size of its
members and the size distribution of each popu-
lation or level of concentration.
The results indicate the usefulness of modelling
competition between populations using these last
two approaches. Moreover, our results suggest
that employing usefulness analysis could be worth-
while (Farh et al., 1990; Pearce and Sims, 2002).
Of the three competitive interaction models,
the concentration model is the only one that
allows us to detect the impact of one subform on
the other in each of the organizational subforms.
More speciﬁcally, in the mutual subform, this
model allows us to understand the type of inﬂu-
ence that the stock subform has on the survival
chances of mutual organizations. In this case, the
cross eﬀects of density model and the cross
eﬀects of mass model do not have suﬃcient
capacity to reveal the inﬂuence of one subform
on the other. These two models analyse competi-
tion in a superﬁcial way because they do not
examine thoroughly the power relationships pro-
duced between the members of the organizational
subform, which would conﬁrm the usefulness of
designing the cross eﬀects of concentration
model. That is, it is possible to see how and in
what way concentration has a bearing on the
probability of failure. However, this model is less
eﬀective in explaining this probability of failure.
Thus, it is possible that concentration is a mea-
sure of a dimension other than the concept of
competition. Perhaps it is a concept of competi-
tion related to the degree of similarity between
enterprises. A hypothetical case could arise in
which all the organizations of a population are
clonal, with their weighting in the niche having
very little relevance. In this case, the cross eﬀects
of density model would coincide with the cross
eﬀects of mass model, given that the latter mea-
surement would be a multiple of the former. In
contrast, if there is a large degree of diﬀerence
between organizations, the cross eﬀects of density
and the cross eﬀects of mass models measure
diﬀerent things.
Applying the competitive interaction models,
we can determine two basic questions that aﬀect
the success and survivorship of organizations in
each subform. On one side, we detect the exis-
tence of interdependence between the organiza-
tional subforms that constitute the industry
under analysis, and, on the other, it appears that
the mutual subform is ecologically the stronger,
as indicated by the signiﬁcant impact produced
by the cross coeﬃcients. In any case, the complex
relationship between the ownership structure and
the competitive processes between the organiza-
tional subforms described becomes evident only
in the case of the concentration eﬀect.





















Figure 9. Cross eﬀects of concentration impact on organizational failure probability of mutual subform.
77 New size measurements in Population EcologyWe conclude that we should incorporate the
size of organization in the measurements used to
model competition between populations, either
by summing organizational sizes or through the
level of concentration of the rival population.
Moreover, the models developed using these
measurements form a common link between
researchers in the ﬁeld of industrial organization
and organizational ecology (Boone and van
Witteloostuijn, 1995).
The validity of these results is conditioned by
the development of similar studies in diﬀerent
environmental contexts, and in populations of
other industrial sectors and services. The competi-
tive interaction models designed in this research
would be validated by statistically signiﬁcant
results. On the other hand, the signiﬁcance given
to the size of organization by the cross eﬀects of
mass and concentration models could have its
disadvantages, as there is no direct evidence of
causal mechanisms associated with the size of
organization (Barron, 1999). Size is correlated to
many other organizational characteristics and, for
that reason, we must be cautious in using this var-
iable as an explanatory causal factor of mortality.
Despite these limitations, the results allow us
to point out some leads in this research to be fol-
lowed up in the future. On the one hand, we
could apply the competitive interaction models in
the third level of analysis of ecological theory,
community ecology, to observe the evolution of
population communities. More speciﬁcally, and
within the sector in question, we could examine
how populations found at diﬀerent stages of the
olive oil agro-alimentary chain interact. For
example, one might analyse what inﬂuence the
populations of reﬁning and bottling enterprises
have on oil mill populations. On the other hand,
one might analyse the behaviour of the cross
eﬀects of mass and the cross eﬀects of concentra-
tion models in the area of organizational found-
ing. It would also be useful to examine the
prediction potential of the cross eﬀects of con-
centration model when organizational growth
rates are estimated.
Finally, this research has placed the spotlight
on competition between populations as a poten-
tially important factor in explaining the vital
ratios. Clearly, competition between populations
deserves more theoretical and empirical attention.
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